Moral realism: the basis and history of this philosophical position

Let us see on what basic assumptions this theory of ethics is based.

Moral realism is a philosophical stance that defends the objective existence of moral facts.. That is, it holds that, regardless of subjective, cognitive or social properties, moral premises and actions have an objectively verifiable reality.

The latter has generated long and complex philosophical discussions around questions such as the following: are there really true moral statements? does honesty, for example, have an objective reality? what is it that gives the quality of "true" to a moral statement? Is it a metaphysical debate or rather a semantic one? Also, beyond the philosophical debates, moral realism has been incorporated into important theories of psychological development.

In line with the above, we will see in an introductory way what moral realism is, what are the philosophical positions with which it debates and how it has been incorporated into psychology.

What is moral realism?

Moral realism is the philosophical stance that affirms the objective existence of moral facts. According to Devitt (2004), for moral realism, there are moral statements that are objectively true, from which the following conclusion can be drawn: there are persons and actions that are, in objective terms, morally good, bad, honest, unkindetc.

For its advocates, moral realism is an important part of the worldview of subjects in general, and was so for the social sciences especially before the emergence of contemporary currents that questioned the relationship between "meaning" and "truth".

He argues, for example, that a person's cruelty functions as an explanation of his behavior, which makes moral facts part of the hierarchy of facts that make up the natural world.

Some background

Realism, more generally, is a philosophical stance that holds the objective (observer-independent) existence of the facts of the world.. This means that our perception is a faithful representation of what we observe, and the same when we speak: by stating something in literal terms, its existence and veracity are confirmed. That is to say that at the Heart of this argument is the univocal relation between language and meaning.

Since the "linguistic turn" of the twentieth century, philosophical debates and issues have been dealt with in relation to language and the relationship between language and meaning has been questioned, thus calling into question the most fundamental philosophical truths.

The latter has led different philosophers to discern between debates about the meaning we give to the world, and debates about things in the external world. That is, between metaphysical debates and semantic debates. Realism as a philosophical stance can be observed in many different areas, for example, in philosophy of science, in epistemology, or, as in the present case, in morality.

Dimensions of moral realism

According to this philosophical position, moral facts are translated into psychological and social facts..

There are, therefore, actions that "should" be carried out and others that should not, as well as a series of rights that can be attributed to the subjects. And all this can be verified objectively, since they exist independently of the person or the social context that observes or defines them. Therefore, Devitt (2004) tells us that moral realism is sustained in two dimensions:

1. Independence

Moral reality is independent of the mind, since moral facts are objective (they are not shaped by our feelings, opinions, theories or social conventions).

2. Existence

It maintains a commitment to moral facts, for it affirms their objective existence.

Criticisms and debates surrounding the objectivity of moral facts.

Criticism of moral realism has come from subjectivist and relativist currents. that have questioned the relationship between language and the different elements that make up a reality, both psychological and social, as well as the possibility of speaking about this reality independently of who defines or experiences it.

Specifically, in the context of moral realism and relativism, two main criticisms arise, known as "non-cognitivism" and "error theories". All of them debate around the same object of investigation: moral claims.

And they ask, on the one hand, whether such statements speak of moral facts, and on the other, whether those facts, or at least some of them, are true. While moral realism would answer both questions in the affirmative, and ask what makes a moral fact "true" in universal terms, non-cognitivism and error theories would answer in different ways.

Non-cognitivism

Non-cognitivism holds that moral affirmations do not correspond to moral properties, in fact, they are not properly affirmations, but indicative sentences without a truth condition corresponding to facts.

They are sentences that express attitudes, emotions, prescribe norms, but not moral facts per se. This semantic analysis is accompanied by a metaphysical stance that affirms that there are no moral properties or facts.

That is, non-cognitivists deny that moral statements allude to objective facts, and therefore also deny that they are true. In other words, they deny realist explanations of moral nature and reality, and deny realist claims about the causal role of reality.

Error Theory

Broadly speaking, Error Theory, by the Australian philosopher (known for his moral skepticism) John Leslie Mackie, says that moral statements do indeed contain moral meanings, but that none of them can be completely true. That is, there are moral facts that are reported by moral statements, but they are not necessarily true.

For error theory, there are no moral facts per se, i.e., it denies the existence of any objective reality of morality. To analyze why people discuss moral facts that do not exist, someone who takes a position in defense of error theories might point out how moral statements are used to mobilize emotions, attitudes, or personal interests (on the assumption that such discussions report facts with moral meanings).

On the other hand, someone advocating noncognitivism might analyze the same situation by referring to the practical utility of speaking as if moral statements truly purport to report facts, even though they do not (on the assumption that moral statements do not even purport to report facts).

Moral realism in developmental psychology

Moral realism is also one of the key concepts in Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget's theory of moral development.

Broadly speaking, what he proposes is that children go through two major phases characterized by stages of progressively abstract reasoning. These phases follow the same sequence in all children, regardless of their cultural context or any other element external to the subject himself. The phases are as follows:

• Heteronomous or moral realism stage (5 to 10 years).where children attribute moral rules to authority and power figures in a dichotomous perspective of good and evil, and let feelings such as honesty or justice emerge.
• Autonomous stage or moral independence (10 years and older)When children attribute arbitrariness to rules, they can challenge or violate them and also modify them based on negotiation.

Later, the American psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg comes to the conclusion that moral maturity is not reached after the second stage proposed by Piaget. He elaborates his own scheme of moral development in six stages that include the first two of the Swiss psychologist, including the idea that morality has universal principles that cannot be acquired in early childhood.

What Kohlberg does is to take Piaget's theories of cognitive development to more detailed studies on the evolution of moral judgments; understanding these as a reflective process on values, and from the possibility of ordering them in a logical hierarchy that allows facing different dilemmas.

The studies of Piaget and Kohlberg had a very important impact on developmental psychology; however, they have also been criticized precisely for appealing to a neutrality and universality of moral development that could be applied to understand all subjects regardless of issues such as cultural context or gender.

Bibliographical references:

• Sayre-McCord, G. (2015). Moral Realism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved August 13, 2018. Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-realism/
• Devitt, M. (2004). Moral realism: a naturalistic perspective. Areté Revista de Filosofía, XVI(2): 185-206.
• Barra, E. (1987). Moral development: an introduction to Kohlberg's theory. Revista Latinoamericana de Psicología, 19 (1): 7:18.