Verificationism: what is it and what are its philosophical proposals?

A summary of the philosophical development of verificationism and its main representatives.

One of the criteria of scientific demarcation is verificationism, the idea that for something to be considered significant it must be empirical.the idea that for something to be considered significant it must be empirically demonstrated or, rather, be able to be grasped through the senses.

Over the years there have been several currents that could be considered as supporters of this criterion of scientific demarcation, although it is true that they use their particular vision of what is understood as meaningful knowledge.

Next we will see what verificationism is, which historical currents could be considered as followers of this idea and what differentiates it from falsificationism.

Verificationism: what it is, historical currents and falsificationism

Verificationism, also called significance criterion, is a term used to describe the current followed by those who favor the use of the verification principle in science. the current followed by those who are in favor of using the principle of verification in science, i.e., holding that only statements (hypotheses, hypotheses, theories, etc.) can be verified.that is, to hold that only statements (hypotheses, theories...) that are empirically verifiable (e.g., through the senses) are cognitively meaningful. That is, if something cannot be demonstrated by means of the senses, physical experience or perception, then it is a rather rejectable idea.

The criterion of meaningfulness has been a topic of debate among even those who claim to be verificationists, basically because many philosophical debates are about the veracity of statements that are not empirically verifiable. Verificationism has come to be used as a rule to show that metaphysical, ethical and religious statements are meaningless, although not all verificationists consider that such statements are not verifiable, as would be the case of classical pragmatists.although not all verificationists consider these kinds of statements to be unverifiable, as would be the case of classical pragmatists.

1. Empiricism

Taking a historical perspective on the idea of verificationism, we can place its earliest origins in empiricism, with figures such as the English philosopher John Locke (1632-1704). The main premise in empiricism is that the only source of knowledge is experience through the senses, something actually advocated by empiricism.The main premise in empiricism is that the only source of knowledge is experience through the senses, something that verificationism actually defends and that, in fact, it could be said that the criterion of verification is the consequence of this first empiricist idea.

Within the empiricist philosophy it was held that the ideas that haunt our minds must be the result of perception-sensation, that is, sensations that we have converted into ideas or also the combination of those same ideas obtained through experience converted into new concepts. At the same time, this movement is associated with the idea that there is no possible way to make an idea come to our mind without being connected to perceptions and that, therefore, it has to be empirically verifiable. Otherwise it would be a fantasy.

This conception of where ideas came from led empiricists like David Hume to reject philosophical positions about more metaphysical ideas, such as the existence of God, the soul or the self. This was motivated by the fact that these concepts and any other spiritual idea does not really have a physical object from which it emanates, that is, there is no empirically experiencible element from which the idea of God, the soul or the being itself is derived.

2. Logical positivism

The philosophical current that has been most closely related to verificationism is undoubtedly logical positivism.. Until the 1920s, the reflections that were made about science were characterized by being the fruit of isolated thinkers, philosophers who had little interaction with each other and who chose to discuss other questions of philosophical interest, although this does not mean that there were no precedents in the debate on how the scientific should be delimited.

In 1922 what was called the Vienna Circle was formed in Austria.The circle was a group of thinkers who met for the first time to discuss at length what science was, including philosophers as well as scientists. The members of this circle could not be considered "pure" philosophers, since they had worked in some particular scientific field and had been getting an idea of what science was from their first-hand experience.

This group gave rise to the epistemological current of logical positivism, with figures such as Rudolf Carnal (1891-1970) and Otto Neurath (1882-1945) among its major references. This movement made verificationism its central thesis in order to unify philosophy and science under the unify philosophy and science under a common naturalistic theory of knowledge.. His objective was that, if this could be achieved, it would be possible to clearly delimit the scientific from the non-scientific, focusing research efforts on ideas that would really contribute to the development of humanity.

3. Pragmatism

Although pragmatism appeared before logical positivism, its influence on this second movement was rather scarce, although they did have in common their interest in the verification of knowledge in order to consider it significant. Likewise, there are many differences between the two movements, the main one being that pragmatism was not in favor of completely rejecting disciplines such as metaphysics, morals, religion and ethics simply because many of their postulates were not empirically demonstrable, something that the positivists were in favor of.

The pragmatists felt that, rather than rejecting metaphysics, ethics, or religion simply because they failed to pass the verification principle, it was appropriate to propose a new standard for good metaphysics, religion, and ethics, it was appropriate to propose a new standard for a good metaphysics, religion, and ethicswithout forgetting the fact that they are not empirically demonstrable disciplines, but no less useful in certain contexts.

4. Falsificationism

The opposite or, rather, antagonistic idea to verificationism is falsificationism.. This concept refers to the fact that one must look for an observational fact that can annul an initial statement, hypothesis or theory and that, if not found, the original idea is reinforced. Verificationism would be the opposite in the sense that empirical evidence is sought to demonstrate the proposed theory, so that it can be corroborated and, if this is not the case, it is considered that it has not passed the verification criterion. Both concepts fall within the problem of inductivism.

It is commonly believed that it was Karl Popper (1902-1994) who rejected the requirement that for a postulate to be meaningful it must be verifiable, asking instead that it should be falsifiable. In any case, Popper later indicated that his falsifiability requirement was not intended as a theory of meaning, but as a methodological proposal for the sciences.. But in spite of this fact there are not a few who group Popper in the group of the verificationists, even though he is a fair critic of verificationism.

This problem refers to the fact that one cannot affirm something universal from the particular data offered by experience. For example, no matter how many millions of white swans we see, we cannot affirm that "all swans are white". On the other hand, if we find a black swan, even if it is only one, we will be able to affirm without any doubt that "Not all swans are white". It is for this very idea that Popper chooses to introduce falsificationism as a criterion of scientific demarcation.