Materialistic Eliminativism: a philosophy that discards subjectivity

Is it enough to understand consciousness by looking at the functioning of the nervous system?

Materialist Eliminativism is the philosophical position that denies the existence of "mental states", proposing to eliminate the explanatory apparatus that has led us to understand the "mind" as we have done since the seventeenth century, and to create another that takes up the material conditions of existence.

Although it is a radical proposal, Materialist Eliminativism has had an important impact on the way philosophy is done, and a special What exactly is eliminativism and where does it come from?

Eliminativism: do mental states really exist?

The "mind" is a concept we use so often that we could hardly doubt its existence. In fact, to a large extent scientific psychology has been devoted to the study of processes such as common sense, beliefs or sensations; derived from a specific and quite widespread understanding of the "mind" or "mental states".

Already in the 17th century Descartes had insisted that the only thing we human beings cannot doubt is our ability to think, thus laying the foundations for the development of our current concept of "mind", "consciousness", "mental states" and even modern psychology.

What Materialist Eliminativism does is to take all this up again, but to open a debate on whether these concepts do not open a debate on whether these concepts refer to things that really exist, and therefore question whether they do.and therefore questions whether it is wise to continue to use them.

It is then a contemporary proposal that says that our way of understanding mental states has a series of fundamental shortcomings, which even render invalid some concepts, such as beliefs, sensations, common sense, and others that even make some concepts invalid, such as beliefs, sensations, common sense, and others whose existence is difficult to question.

Some fundamental philosophical proposals

Materialistic Eliminativism proposes that, beyond modifying the way in which we have understood the mind, what we should do is to eliminate all the explanatory apparatus that has led us to describe it (that is why it is called "eliminativism"). The reason: mental states are non-existent things, in any case, they would be cerebral or neuronal phenomena.This would require the formulation of a new explanatory apparatus based on material reality (that is why it is "materialistic").

In other words, Materialist Eliminativism analyzes some concepts about the mind and mental states, and concludes that they are empty notions because they are often reduced to intentional properties or subjective experiences that do not refer to something that has a physical reality.

From this, a second proposal is derived: the conceptual framework of neurosciences should be the one that explains mental states, because these sciences can refer to material realities.

As in all philosophical currents, there are different nuances depending on the author; there are those who say that the issue is not so much the non-existence of mental states, but that they are not well described, so they should be replaced by the concepts that have been suggested in brain studies. In this same sense, the concept of "qualia" is another proposal that has brought to light the gap between explanations of subjective experiences and physical systems, especially the brain system.especially the brain system.

Finally, Materialistic Eliminativism has also raised questions, for example, the question of where the boundaries between eliminativism and materialistic reductionism lie.

Eliminativism has not only been materialistic

Eliminativism has had many facets. Broadly speaking, we could see some tinges of eliminativism in several of the philosophical and deterministic proposals of the 18th century, which questioned concepts which questioned concepts also related to psychology, such as "freedom" or the "I". In fact, materialism itself is already an eliminativist position, insofar as the conditions of existence of non-material elements are rejected.

We usually know as Materialistic Eliminativism the position that specifically denies the existence of mental states. It is a more or less recent proposal, which arises from the philosophy of mind and whose main antecedent is the work of the philosopher Charlie Dunbar Broad; but which formally arises in the second half of the twentieth century among the works of Wilfred Sellars, W.V.O. Quine, Paul Feyerabend, Richard Rorty, Paul and Patricia Churchland, and S. Stitch. Hence it is also known as contemporary Materialist Eliminativism.

Formally, the term "Materialist Eliminativism" is attributed to a 1968 publication by James Cornman entitled "On the elimination of entitled "On the elimination of "Sensations" and Sensations".

Impact on modern psychology

In its more modern versions, Materialist Eliminativism proposes that our understanding of "common sense," "mental states," or psychological processes such as desires or beliefs is deeply flawed because they arise from postulates that are not actually observable, thus making their explanatory value questionable.

In other words, Materialist Eliminativism allows us to update the discussions on the mind-mind relationship. to update the discussions about the mind-body relation (through the mind-brain formula) and suggest, for example, that beliefs, not having a physiological correlate, should be eliminated or replaced by some concept that does have a physical correlate; and in the same sense is the proposal that, strictly speaking, sensations are not really "sensations" but are brain processes, so we should reconsider their use.

In sum, on the basis of Materialist Eliminativism psychology of common sense and cognitive sciences are questioned.. It is not surprising that in the last decades this position has gained much strength, especially in the debates on cognitive sciences, neurosciences and philosophy of mind. Moreover, this has been a topic of discussion not only for mind studies but also for those who analyze the processes of construction and transformation of modern theoretical frameworks.

Undoubtedly, it is a current that has not only put on the table fundamental questions about our way of understanding ourselves and what surrounds us, but from there, it makes the point that the most popular explanations are largely insufficient as well as susceptible to constant updating.

Bibliographical references:

• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2013). Eliminative Materialism. Retrieved April 19, 2018. Available at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/materialism-eliminative/#BriHis.
• Braun, R. (2008). Philosophical eliminativism and its attack on psychology. Persona, 11: 51-67.
• Feser, E. (2005). Philosophy of mind: A short introduction. Oneworld publications: United Kingdom.