The Extended Theory of Mind: psyche beyond our brain

This philosophical approach raises a question: where does the mind begin and where does it end?

It is well known that the term "mind" refers to the set of cognitive processes, i.e., consciousness, thought, intelligence, perception, memory, attention, etc. But does the mind have a material reality? But does the mind have a material reality, is it a tangible and concrete entity or space, or is it an abstract concept that groups together a series of immaterial experiences?

The philosophy of mind, together with cognitive science, has offered different theories to answer these questions. In turn, the answers have often been formulated around the traditional opposition between body and mind. To resolve this opposition, Extended Mind theory questions whether it is possible to understand the mind beyond the brain.and even beyond the individual himself.

In the following text we will see briefly what are the proposals of the Extended Mind hypothesis, as well as some of its main antecedents.

Theory of the Extended Mind - mental processes beyond the brain?

The theory of the Extended Mind began its formal development in 1998, from the work of the philosopher Susan Hurleywho proposed that mental processes did not necessarily have to be explained as internal processes, since the mind did not only exist within the narrow confines of the skull. In her work "Consciousness in action" she criticized the input/output perspective of traditional cognitive theory.

In the same year, the philosophers Andy Clark and David Chalmers published the article "The extended mind", which is considered the foundational text of this theory. And a decade later, in 2008, Andy Clark publishes Supersizing the mindwhich ends up introducing the extended mind hypothesis in the debates of the philosophy of mind and cognitive sciences.

From computational metaphor to cyborg metaphor

The Extended Mind theories are part of the historical development of the philosophy of mind and cognitive sciences. Within this development different theories have emerged about the functioning of mental states and their consequences in human life. and their consequences in human life. We will see briefly what the latter consists of.

The individualistic model and computation

The most classical tradition of cognitive science has taken the metaphor of the computational operating system as an explanatory model of the mind. as an explanatory model of the mind. Broadly speaking, it proposes that cognitive processing begins with inputs (sensory inputs), and ends with outpus (behavioral outputs).

In the same sense, mental states are faithful representations of the elements of the world, are produced by internal manipulations of information, and generate a series of inferences. For example, perception would be an individual and precise reflection of the external world; and occurs by internal logical order similar to that of a digital operating system..

Thus, the mind or mental states are an entity found within each individual. In fact, it is these states that give us the quality of being subjects (autonomous and independent of the environment and relations with it).

It is a theory that follows the dualistic and individualistic tradition on reasoning and the human being; whose greatest precursor was René Descartes, who doubted everything but what he thought. So much so that he inherited the now famous "I think, therefore I am".

But, with the development of science, it became possible to suggest that the mind is not just an abstraction but that there is a tangible place within the human body for its storage. there is a tangible place within the human body for its storage.. This place is the brain, which under the premises of the computational perspective would fulfill the functions of a hardware, insofar as it is the material and self-configurable support of mental processes.

The mind-brain identity

The above emerges in continuous debate with theories of mind-brain identity, which suggest that mental processes are nothing more than physical-chemical activity. are nothing more than physicochemical activity of the brain..

In this sense, the brain is not only the material support of mental processes, but the mind itself is the result of the activity of that organ; thus, it can only be understood through the physical laws of nature. Both mental processes and subjectivity thus become an epiphenomenon (phenomena secondary to physical events in the brain).

In this sense it is a theory with a naturalistic approachIt is also a cerebrocentric theory, since everything human would be reduced to the action potentials and the physicochemical activity of our neuronal networks. Among the most representative of these theories is, for example, materialistic eliminativism or neurological monism.

Beyond the brain (and the individual)

In the face of the latter, other theories or explanatory models of the mind emerge. One of them is the theory of the Extended Mind, which has tried to locate the processing of information, and other mental states, beyond the brain; that is, in the relationships that the person establishes with the environment and its objects.

It is a matter, then, of extending the concept of "mind" beyond the individual himself. The latter represents an important break with the individualism individualism of the more classical cognitive science.

But in order to achieve this, it was necessary to begin by redefining both the concept of mind and mental processes, and in this, the reference model was the functionalist one. In other words, it was necessary to understand mental processes on the basis of the effects they cause, or as effects caused by different causes.

This paradigm had already permeated computational hypotheses. However, for the Extended Theory of Mind, mental processes are not only generated inside the individual, but also outside the individual. And they are "functional" states in that they are defined by a cause-effect relationship with a certain function (a relationship that encompasses a set of material elements, even without life of its own).

To put it another way, mental states are the last link in a long chain of causes that ultimately have the effect of these processes. And the other links in the chain can range from bodily and sensorimotor skills to a calculator, a computer, a watch or a cell phone. All these are elements that allow us to generate what we know as intelligence, thought, beliefs and so on.

Consequently, our mind extends beyond the specific limits of our brain, and even beyond our own limits.and even beyond our general physical limits.

So what is a "subject"?

The above not only changes the way of understanding the "mind" but also the definition of the "self" (it is understood as an "extended self"), as well as the definition of one's own behavior, since it is no longer a rationally planned action. It is a matter of a learning that is the result of practices in the material environment.. As a result, the "individual" is rather a "subject/agent".

For the same reason, this theory is considered by many as a radical and active determinism. It is no longer the case that the environment shapes the mind, but that the environment is part of the mind itself: "cognitive states have a wide localization and are not limited by the narrow boundary of the human body" (Andrada de Gregorio and Sánchez Parera, 2005).

The subject is susceptible of being constantly modified by its continuous contact with other material elements.. But it is not enough to have a first contact (for example, with a technological device) to consider it an extension of the mind and the subject. In order to be able to think of it in this way, it is essential that conditions such as automatism and accessibility exist.

To exemplify this, Clark and Chalmers (cited by Andrada de Gregorio and Sánchez Parera, 2005) give the example of a subject with Alzheimer's disease. To compensate for his memory losses, the subject writes down everything that seems important to him in a notebook; to such an extent that, automatically, he becomes accustomed to reviewing this tool in the interaction and resolution of everyday problems.

The notebook serves as a storage device for his beliefs, as well as a material extension of his memory. The notebook thus plays an active role in this person's cognition, and, together of this person, and together, they establish a cognitive system.

The latter opens a new question: does the extension of the mind have limits? According to its authors, mental activity occurs in a constant negotiation with these limits. However, the Extended Mind theory has been questioned precisely because it does not offer concrete answers to this.

Likewise, the Extended Mind theory has been rejected by the more brain-centered perspectives, of which the following are important exponents philosophers of mind Robert Rupert and Jerry Fodor are important exponents.. In this regard it has also been challenged for not delving into the realm of subjective experiences, and for focusing on a strongly goal-oriented view.

Are we all cyborgs?

It would seem that the theory of the Extended Mind comes close to proposing that human beings are and act as a hybrid species similar to the figure of the cyborg. The latter understood as the fusion between a living organism and a machineand whose purpose is to enhance, or in some cases replace, organic functions.

In fact, the term "cyborg" is an anglicism meaning "cybernetic organism". But the theory of the Extended Mind is not the only one that has allowed us to reflect on this question. In fact, a few years before the foundational works, in 1983 the feminist philosopher Donna Haraway published an essay entitled Cyborg Manifesto.

Broadly speaking, by means of this metaphor she intended to question the problematics of Western traditions strongly based on an "antagonistic dualism", with visible effects on scelialism, colonialism and patriarchy (issues that have been present in some traditions of feminism itself).

Thus, we could say that the metaphor of the cyborg opens the possibility of thinking about a hybrid subject beyond mind-body dualisms.. The difference between one and the other is that the Extended Mind proposal is inscribed in a tradition closer to logical positivism, with a very specific conceptual rigor; while Haraway's proposal follows the line of critical theory, with a determining socio-political component (Andrada de Gregorio and Sánchez Parera, 2005).

Bibliographical references:

• García, I. (2014). Review of Andy Clark and David Chalmers, La mente extendida, KRK, Ediciones, Oviedo, 2011. Diánoia, LIX (72): 169-172.
• Andrada de Gregorio, G. and Sánchez Parera, P. (2005). Towards a continental-analytic alliance: the cyborg and the extended mind. Guindilla Bunda Collective Coord. (Ábalos, H.; García, J.; Jiménez, A. Montañez, D.) Memorias del 50º.